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Henri Bergson considered the truest form of knowing to be 
attainable only through acts of intuition, as he believed the 
intuitive state created a direct connection to reality itself. 
For architecture, a field that is grounded in experience, it is 
important to balance the drive of the intellect with intuitive 
strategies, which help move toward the unification of data 
under an experiential aegis. Drawing primarily upon the 
writings of Bergson and Martin Heidegger, this paper 
describes how the reductive proclivities of the intellect tend 
to obscure the embodied insights of intuition, and how the 
listening response of intuition reveals a primal language 
that is activated by the immersed dialogue of one 




…it is not the case that by means of likeness a 
finite intellect can attain the truth about things. For 
truth is not something more or less, but 
something indivisible. Whatever is not truth 
cannot measure the truth precisely ... Hence the 




The Western educational system since the enlightenment 
has generally aimed toward creating problem solvers and 
answer finders, but has remained limited in the cultivation of 
ability with measures outside the intellectual realm. 
Architectural education is a rarity that straddles a zone 
between intellect and intuition. However it too often falls 
prey to intellectual biases. Although understanding codes, 
environmental controls, construction, etc. are all essential to 
the practice of architecture, these intellectual skills form 
only part of the picture. Yes - buildings must stand up; yes – 
buildings must keep weather out; and yes - buildings must 
accommodate real needs; but these things alone are not 
architecture.  
 
The heart of architecture lies in the vicissitudes of 
embodied experience and the pursuit of it asks that one 
work with experience and feeling in a participatory manner. 
This engagement begins an understanding that infuses new 
work with energy and mystery. However, capturing the 
intangible qualities of the experiential and proceeding 
toward great moments of architecture necessarily requires 
a confrontation with ambiguity and the risk of the unknown 
as this acknowledges situational specificity. By proceeding 
in the face of the unknown a creator engages in dialogue 
with that which is becoming.  
 
Intuition is one name given the human capacity to 
participate in this process of becoming. Intuition touches 
upon things that are inaccessible to the intellect and 
interprets them through its activated flow. In order to enter 
this flow in architecture, design must be undertaken with 
both courage and freedom; in this way intuition is allowed to 
participate within the uncertainty of becoming and stimulate 
currents of significance. The communication of intuition 
speaks silently through revealing and disclosing. Partaking 
in this dialogue demands that one genuinely recognize, as 
Martin Heidegger describes, “this speaking that listens and 
accepts is responding.”2 In other words, intuitive dialogue 
connects us to our very capacity for not knowing and allows 
a tarrying in the specific uncertainty of a situation. For 
Heidegger, “language is the house of being,”3 and, 
“speaking about language almost inevitably turns it into an 
object.”4 In other words, language is the significance of 
situation and in order for the “saying” of language to bring 
intelligibility to one’s dealings in the world one must first and 
foremost dwell in language. The listening of intuition hears 
this saying of language by enacting it and in so doing 
affords the world an opportunity to speak. In design when 
we let the world speak our architecture becomes both 
articulate and significant.  
 
The Hearing of Intuition 
 
French philosopher Henri Bergson believed intuition to be 
the true method for understanding, occurring when one 
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lives in the world with intimacy.5 Intuition arises with a 
response to the call of spontaneous engagement which 
allows focus, absorption, and subsequently insight. For 
Bergson this insight is not possible from the perspective of 
mere observer or through reflection as he says the intuitive 
communicates, “an external reality which is given 
immediately to our mind.”6 With a concern similar to that 
seen in Heidegger’s comment about the danger of 
language becoming an object, Bergson understands that 
when an experience is mediated by reflection, there 
emerges a rift between subject and object; the separation of 
reflection ensures that one does not experience the reality 
as one remains outside of an encounter by way of their 
observations. Bergson describes the difference between 
the two kinds of knowing in his essay, “An Introduction to 
Metaphysics”: 
 
Take, for example, the movement of an object in 
space. I perceive it differently according to the 
point of view from which I look at it, whether from 
that of mobility or immobility. I express it 
differently, furthermore as I relate it to the system 
of axes or reference points, that is to say, 
according to the symbols by which I translate it. 
And I call it relative for this double reason: in 
either case, I place myself outside the object 
itself. When I speak of absolute movement, it 
means that I attribute to the mobile an inner being 
and, as it were, states of soul; it also means that I 
am in harmony with these states and enter into 
them by an effort of imagination. Therefore, 
according to whether the object is mobile or 
immobile, whether it adopts one movement or 




Figure 1: Engaging movement and mood 
through imagination.8 
 
So it is this ability to adopt movement through the “effort of 
imagination” that characterizes in part the difference 
between the intellectual perspective and the intuitive for 
Bergson (Fig. 1). Now as Bergson and Heidegger are 
attempting to avoid the subject/object dichotomy, I do not 
mean to suggest that intellect and intuition are oppositional 
or should be thought of as a binary. In fact, the process of 
design depends upon the inseparability of the two. 
Ironically, the relative indefinability of intuition often allows it 
to be veiled by the more palpable presence of the intellect. 
In this way, the intellect tends to segregate or obfuscate 
intuition, which leads this discussion to perhaps over-stress 
intuition so as to help shed light on both the importance of 
intuition and some of the reasons for the dichotomy that 
arises between intuition and intellect. The requirement for 
imagination of which Bergson speaks is one of the reasons 
that the intellect becomes suspicious of intuition in that for 
the rational mind intuition appears to lack any real grounds. 
Heidegger has suggested that part of what is coming into 
play here is a poor understanding of those modes of 
behavior which are not rooted in the rational. He sees these 
misconceptions and the corresponding over-valuation of the 
rational being perpetuated by viewpoints and translations in 
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the history of Western thought, which have misunderstood 
more previously nuanced conceptions.9 Offering an 
alternative stance on the way we encounter the world he 
says, 
 
Perhaps however what we call a feeling or a 
mood, here and in similar instances, is more 
reasonable –that is, more intelligently perceptive 
– because more open to being than all that 
reason which, having meanwhile become ratio, 
was misinterpreted as being rational.10 
 
Heidegger takes the rational to be a derivative mode of 
other more involved ways of knowing and Bergson too 
thinks the intellect’s limitation is that it has a tendency to 
take up things beyond its real purview. In this way it 
suppresses other vital attributes of our perceptive faculties. 
Bergson explains that intuition is not something mystical or 
irrational and in fact is quite important: 
 
There is nothing mysterious about this faculty. 
Whoever has worked successfully at literary 
composition well knows that when the subject has 
been studied at great length, all the documents 
gathered together, all notes taken, something 
more is necessary to get down to the work of 
composition itself: an effort, often painful, 
immediately to place oneself in the very heart of 
the subject and to seek as deeply as possible an 
impulsion which, as soon as found, carries one 
forward of itself. This impulsion, once received, 
sets the mind off on a road where it finds both the 
information it had gathered and other details as 
well...yet if one turns around suddenly to seize 
the impulsion felt, it slips away; for it was not a 
thing but an urge to movement, and although 
infinitely extensible, it is simplicity itself.11 
 
So as Bergson suggests, intuition is the movement of being 
absorbed in the duration of time, and often this absorption 
is facilitated, as the quote suggests, through actively taking 
up the world.12 In this way work becomes a kind of kindling 
that sparks engagement and enables one to proceed with 
focus, complementing intellectual understandings with the 
intuitive. In design this sort of disposition allows one to revel 
in the act of making, suspending the burdens of knowing 
what it means, worrying about what is next, or “making it 




Figure 2: Developing mood into a café.13 
 
For intuition to function, the time for evaluation occurs after 
the intuitive work is complete. This cyclic movement allows 
the intuitive to be intuitive and the intellectual to be 
intellectual in what Heidegger has called the hermeneutic 
circle. This phenomenon shows the paradox of the creative 
process in that this pair of opposites transcends binary 
opposition through the movement of a work becoming. This 
process is carried out as a listening response and despite 
Bergson’s claims of the simplicity of intuition, allowing the 
intuitive to inform a project is not always quite so easy 
which is why we will now proceed to look at its mechanisms 
with some scrutiny.  
 
The Obstacles to Intuition 
 
It is interesting that the surrender to the intuitive often 
becomes increasingly difficult with the more one knows. 
This difficulty is encouraged by our basic workings as 
human beings. Aldous Huxley once said that “…the function 
of the brain and nervous system and sense organs is in the 
main eliminative and not productive.”14 Bergson has made 
similar claims about the human predilection toward 
definition and categorization, arguing that intellect 
“…instinctively selects in a given situation whatever is like 
something already known; it seeks this out, in order that it 
might apply its principle that ‘like produces like.’”15 So we 
are, by our evolution, trained to assimilate past experiences 
in order to learn from our encounters and in so doing 
reduce the need to confront the strangeness of the world. 
This ability certainly serves us in our daily activities of 
crossing streets, cooking food, communicating with others, 
and so on, however, despite all of the obvious benefits, this 
remarkable capacity for assimilating knowledge often 
clouds our perceptions as well. Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
explains how these mechanisms can force a skewed 
dialogue with reality. 
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…when I give a dictionary definition of a table – a 
horizontal flat surface supported by three or four 
legs, which can be used for eating off, reading a 
book on, and so forth – I may feel that I have got, 
as it were, to the essence of the table… In this 
example, however, I am not perceiving but rather 
defining. By contrast, when I perceive a table, I do 
not withdraw my interest from the particular way it 
has of performing its function as a table…What 
interests me is the unique movement from the 
feet to the table top which resists gravity; this is 
what makes each table different from the next. No 
detail is insignificant: the grain, the shape of the 
feet, the color and age of the wood, as well as the 
scratches or graffiti, which show that age. The 
meaning, ‘table’ will only interest me insofar as it 
arises out of all the ‘details’, which embody its 
present mode of being.16 
 
As this passage suggests, it is in fact the specificity that is 
important in reaching a true understanding of this table, 
which flies in the face of our predisposition toward 
definition, generalization, and category. In this way, intellect 
and habit dim substantive relations with a situation. At stake 
in this phenomenon is the vitality of our interactions, which 
is also reliant upon on an acute awareness within particular 
activities. So the question arises, how does one come to be 
affected by a situation? Perhaps the simplicity that Bergson 
alludes to earlier now may shed some light. It seems his 
notion of simplicity has to do with what Heidegger 
elucidates in his statement that, “… we do not need first to 
call or arrange for this situation in which we let things 
encounter us without mediation. The situation always 
prevails.”17 In other words, the situation is simplicity itself in 
that we need only open ourselves up to it so as to be 
affected by the significance that is always already present 
in its peculiarities. This brings up an important point - 
although one part of intuition is the absorbed intimacy of 
doing, this absorption can become blindly habitual as well. 
Therefore also critical to a living intuition is the attuned 
impulsion that opens the moment of action. The interplay of 
this embodied and absorbed know-how with spontaneous 
attuned action is illustrated in the following Zen parable: 
 
A Chinese painter was once commissioned to 
paint the Emperor's favorite goat. The artist asked 
for the goat, that he might study it. After two years 
the Emperor, growing impatient, asked for the 
return of the goat; the artist obliged. Then the 
Emperor asked about the painting. The artist 
confessed that he had not yet made one, and 
taking an ink brush he drew eight nonchalant 
strokes, creating the most perfect goat in the 
annals of Chinese painting.18 
 
So in this story one can see how the depth of 
understanding that comes with prolonged exposure occurs 
though one’s internalization of the knowledge. This 
internalization is fortified through practices of intimacy, 
which then transform into the embodied knowledge of an 
expert. This type of knowledge is not reflected upon, 
memorized, or recollected, rather it must be spontaneously 
enacted in a skillful response. In this way the goat is not 
viewed as an object or a collection of properties gathered 
under the name “goat,” it is an experience. 
 
 
 Figure 3: A dialogue with a landscape.19 
 
The disposition required for this type of intuitive 
engagement with situation might be viewed as synonymous 
with “play.” Intuition (like play) in its pure form, does not 
project results, for the activity itself is reason enough and in 
some respects training intuition is like reminding people 
how to play. The goal of this training is to instill an 
appreciation for forgetting, which is to say a listening. In 
other words, when intuition is functioning one forgets 
premade plans and prejudices -- one is the situation. This is 
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exactly why intuition is important to design. The 
involvement that comes with this mode of engagement 
combats the human propensity for generalization, and 
affords a designer the receptivity necessary to imbibe the 
uniqueness of every place and problem, as well as enter 
into dialogue with their work. Intuitive involvement stands as 
a corrective to the draw of pure “analysis” which finds itself 
right in the middle of the intellectual proclivities toward 
generic description and atomized data collection. Building 
as object, place as object, language as object—each of 
these is problematic, as they are fixed and uninhabitable. 
We necessarily become subjects in this dichotomy. For 
example, site “analysis” invariably misses the “place,” which 
is why I often ask students to refrain from “explaining” 
building sites, preferring that they dwell in them. This 
relation between place and language begins to disclose a 
peculiar understanding of language -- as something that we 
are immersed in (Fig 3).  
 
The Language of Intuition 
 
"Our relation to language is vague, obscure, almost 
speechless"20 
 
For Heidegger, language is not an internal tool-kit made of 
words that one strings together to make meaning, rather it 
is the coherent significance of situation. Heidegger explains 
that “communication is never anything like a conveying of 
experience…from the interior of one subject into the interior 
of another…discourse is the articulation of intelligibility.”21 
Rather than language being something the human mind 
adds to inert objects to give them meaning. Heidegger’s 
notion of language is borne out of the implicit relations of 
one’s circumstances. He writes, “what we ‘first’ hear is 
never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking 
wagon, the motor-cycle…the fire crackling. It requires a 
very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a 
‘pure noise’.”22 For Heidegger, like Bergson, absorbed 
concern allows people and things to reveal functions and 
interrelatedness as freed by our actions. In other words, 
language lives through our daily activities.  In this way 
specific contexts become vital and thus understood through 
participation. This participation reveals language and 
language understood in this way is then a directing towards 
that which “…already lies before us.”23 In this statement, 
Heidegger is saying is that every situation that we 
encounter is laden with aspects of significance in terms of 
being of concern to us. 
Now this notion of “already before us” should not be taken 
as a meta-language, or a positivist view of language and 
this is where the specificity and temporality of situation is 
critical. Moving within the flow of involvements one realizes 
that no instant is ever exactly the same – so it is a 
situational “already-there” that Heidegger suggests. The 
immersive correspondence between the variability of 
situation and language is reflected in Heidegger’s comment 
that, “…we are moving within language, which means 
moving on shifting ground or, still better, on the billowing 
waters of the ocean.”24 So in directing toward what is 
already there, one must also be open to the variability of 
this “there.” Variability is the flux that marks both language 
and situation. In order for one to be able to articulate this 
“there,” one must first develop the capacity to listen and to 
this end Heidegger reminds us again that, “hearing is 
constitutive for discourse.”25 This comment leads one to the 
difficult task of response, which might be phrased as 
hearing and articulating the latent significance (or language) 
of a situation, remaining sensitive to the inevitable 
modulations of temporality. Considering the process of 
design to be a communication, or better a hearing of the 
“saying” of language26 lets us consider how one might 
activate the language of situation.  
 
If one reflects upon the act of questioning within 
Heidegger’s ideas about language then one understands 
the question as a particular frame to reveal aspects of a 
situation. In this way questioning can help to provide 
direction without creating unnecessary restriction and in 
turn open up thinking. The link between thinking and 
questioning is explicated by Heidegger in What is Called 
Thinking, as he explains that thinking is a kind of discourse 
that “…clears its own way only by its own questioning 
advance.”27 This advance may be either verbalized or 
enacted. In architecture, where often the program is seen to 
be the problem, this notion of questioning is often not 
employed very effectively. To be fair, the program is a 
question of sorts but suffers from the same generalities that 
plague our perceptions. Further the notion of program as 
question suffers similar problems to those Heidegger sees 
in the “conventional relation between a sign and its 
signification,”28 where the Greek notion of sign as a 
showing turns into a simple determination. Additionally, 
Heidegger also understands that, "the transformation of the 
sign from something that shows to something that 
designates has its roots in the change in the nature of 
truth."29 This is to say that as this simplification occurs, a 
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richer, more situated understanding of truth is replaced by 
truth as mere correspondence. The effects of this 
transformation become the seeds of an inability with living 
questions. Gilles Deleuze explains how this limitation 
becomes institutionalized in his book Bergsonism:  
 
…this prejudice goes back to childhood, to the 
classroom: it is the school teacher who ‘poses’ 
the problems; the pupil’s task is to discover the 
solutions. In this way we are kept in a kind of 
slavery. True freedom lies in a power to decide to 
constitute problems themselves.30 
 
Bergson himself adds an extra incentive for the rediscovery 
of effective questioning as he explains that “a speculative 
problem is solved as soon as it is clearly stated.”31 Deleuze 
elucidates this insight saying, “... the solution exists then, 
although it may remain hidden and, so to speak, covered 
up.”32 This is to say that, the question directs us toward the 
“already-thereness” and in so doing not only establishes 
that an answer possible but in fact captures the answer 
within the framework of the question itself.  
 
The value of any question is found in the thought it 
provokes and the structure it provides for a further 
“questioning advance,” as this opens the doors toward a 
real understanding of situation and therefore the problem 
itself. In architecture Louis Kahn, a master of the question, 
famously realized that the defining problem for the form and 
the experience of the Kimball Art Museum came from the 
question of the particular way light would enter the building 
from a high point, “where the light is best in its zenith.”33 But 
Kahn is not the only designer to question effectively. 
Another example of a discursive questioning advance 
comes from the Viennese firm Propeller Z. At the inception 
of any project, this team of five designers will sit down 
together and work to draw out the nature of the problem 
through their discussions before any lines are drawn or 
models made. It was explained to me that after agreeing as 
to the fundamental problem, the evolution of their designs 
always progress very quickly.34 The question has also been 
used less conventionally to provide a structure for 
response, as can be seen in the work of Steven Holl. In his 
work, Holl has (famously) used metaphor (seven bottles of 
light in a stone box – Chapel of St. Ignatius, Fig. 4), music 
(Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta by Béla Bartók. 
– Stretto House) and literature (Basho’s poetry–Makuhari 
Housing Project) to circumscribe problems and their 
possible solutions.   
 
 
Figure 4: Seven bottles of light in a stone box – 
Chapel of St. Ignatius 35 
 
However, perhaps the least conventional mode of 
questioning is the most connected to one’s intuitive abilities 
and a Heideggerian notion of language. This occurs when 
the questions are articulated performatively. For example, 
Shunyru Suzuki describes that, “a wonderful painting is the 
result of a feeling in your fingers,” and it is in acting on this 
feeling that ties back into the sort of embodied knowing 
echoed in earlier notions, and correlates directly to of the 
“already thereness” of language as Suzuki says, “if you 
have the feeling of the thickness of the ink in your brush, 
the painting is already there before you paint. When you dip 
your brush into the ink you already know the result of your 
drawing, or else you cannot paint.”36  
 
This is the enactment of language and intuitive knowing 
may “show” from the work. This is to say, in that it may not 
be explained outright but it might be felt though the 
encounter with the finished work itself. With the experience 
of a work as showing or lighting the work penetrates and 
communicates intuitively. In this manner it brings 
Heidegger’s “truth.” 
 
In reaching this “truth” it is the “…effort, often painful…” that 
Bergson mentioned previously, which is necessary for 
showing and becomes the threshold that one must 
perpetually overcome. The Zen tradition says of this 
overcoming that “this is the hard part. Technique, though 
important, is useless without it…”37 As opposed to the 
subject-oriented or agent-centric notions that one must first 
be cognitive of intent before proceeding in action, 
understanding language as a kind of environment that one 
dwells within means that to enact language one must move 
and correct as the dialogue unfolds. This type of formal 
indication is especially effective in complex problems, ones 
that do not ask for the purity of a singular response or 
whose answers are too far away too seen from current 
perspectives. For example in asking students to “build a 
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piece of music,” students enact a “responding that listens” 
so as to dwell within the complexities of, say, Ornette 
Coleman’s “Free Jazz” (Fig. 5). In solving this problem, 
intellect would ask that one stand outside and attempt to 
define the piece, then to contemplate it as a form, whereas 
intuition wants to practice being in the experience and work 
it out through action. In this way the dwelling-in of intuition 
touches the fundamental ground of language.  
 
 
Figure 5: Musical hermeneutics.38 
 
This type of a problem is given in studio not to suggest that 
we need outside inspirations in order to make architecture, 
but rather to introduce a problem in all of its strangeness, in 
the case of music one that envelops you. This is done to 
introduce and practice the complimentary facility of intuition. 
Put another way, most people will say that they “know” what 
a house or school, etc. is but will be confounded by the task 
of building “Free Jazz.” This sort of confrontation teaches 
one the value of knowledge gained through involvement, 
and no matter what the problem this aspect of knowing is 
critical to a response correlate to complexities of the 
problem itself. In attempting to teach lessons about the 
complexity of any architectural problem and the necessity 
for understanding the oscillations of the design 
hermeneutic, these types of inscrutable problems provide 
training for seeing and engaging similar complexities 
whether it be designing a library, backyard deck, glazing 
detail, etc., and allowing the intuitive to fully enter the 
process. The sophistication of response that rises out of 
inhabiting the problem begins to show how this faculty of 
intuition allows a living of language and acknowledges that, 
"we are, then, within language and with language before all 
else."39 And even when language is un-verbalized it still 
speaks to us through the, "...soundless gathering call... we 
call the ringing of stillness."40 Language is always calling to 




The Future for Intuition 
 
 
Figure 6: Improvising with materials at full 
scale.41 
 
As Bergson says that, “… our mind has the irresistible 
tendency to consider the idea it most frequently uses to be 
the clearest,”42 and so it is therefore important to 
compliment the tendencies of mind through the sensitive 
involvement of intuition. This paper is certainly not meant 
repudiate intellect or suggest its processes and insights 
inconsequential but rather to situate intellect within the 
larger domain of the hermeneutic circle where it has as 
equal partner intuition.  
 
With all the requirements of a building, it can sometimes be 
easy to miss the fact that measurable things alone will not 
serve to make it architecture; architecture will be found in 
cracks between the finite elements - the interrelations. 
Martin Heidegger tried to show this throughout his life, and 
that the traditional philosophic problem of the isolated 
subject that attempts to transcend their own subjectivity in 
order to experience the world is in fact a false barrier 
created by the intellect. This derivative state of detached 
reflection takes us away from our more fundamental 
situated involvements, being amidst those people and 
things that concern us. This line of thought is of particular 
interest to a discipline that needs to be aware of 
environmental wholeness and situational specificity.  
 
This notion of intuition and the enacting of language are 
employed in teaching design as a means to dispel notions 
among students that one should wait for the ‘right’ 
inspiration, after which the building will design itself. In this 
misconception what is not understood is that immersion in 
work can create inspiration. So even with the example of 
Propeller Z, who will not initially produce tangible evidence 
of their work, their discourse is still an active generator of 
inspiration and a movement forward against the inertia of 
rumination as that “…effort, often painful…” This is power of 
the “questioning advance” which may be activated, 
propelled, and hopefully ingrained through becoming 
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familiar with one’s ability to listen and respond through the 
actions of design and making.  
 
A significant aspect of initiating and maintaining this type of 
awareness is developing comfort with ambiguity, since the 
genuineness of intuition is to be found in its silence. Notions 
like “right, “whole,” “true,” explain what Bergson conceives 
of when he speaks of the understandings of intuition and it 
is exactly its whispered tones that make intuition difficult to 
work with. As Heidegger says in an early lecture at 
Freiburg, “what develops unity is not an external framework 
of classification…but the how of the respective 
understanding insofar as it has a direction which is decisive 
for each step along the way.”43 And so it is that one might 
proceed through intuition with each step simply counting as 
right for its “rightness” alone. If one begins to categorize 
one begins to generalize and define, and in turn closes off 
the conversation of intuition. Intuitive interactions with 
situation are the ways in which one initiates an ability to, 
“…live in the speaking of language.”44 
 
The goal of this line thinking in design pedagogy is to train a 
familiarity with the sensations of intuition and establish a 
means of employing intuition of one’s own accord. 
Ultimately one might not choose to produce collage, 
spontaneous drawings, or musical structures but the idea is 
that a facility with this attuned state of working can be 
carried over into any aspect of the work one does, be it 
AutoCAD drawings, site visits, or even client meetings (Fig. 
6). It is again the immersive living through a problem that 
releases its finer shades. Intuition compliments the intellect 
by empowering response, and response infuses the 
language of humanity into one’s work—making it intelligible, 
making it emotional, and in many cases making it right.   
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